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Consumer Arbitration As Exceptional Consumer Law
(With A Contractualist Reply To Carrington & Haagen)
Stephen J. Ware*
INTRODUCION
The United States Supreme Court has largely adopted the contractual approach
to arbitration law.' This approach rests on the premise that arbitration law is a part
of contract law so courts must enforce agreements to arbitrate unless contract law
provides a ground for denying enforcement.2 While the contractual approach to
arbitration law has prevailed in the courts, it has many critics in the academy.
3
These critics' arguments, although made in the context of arbitration, sweep far
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Alan Rau, George Wright, Sarah Rudolph Cole, Ken Davis, John Dolan, Mike Floyd, Cliff Palefsky, Andy Klein
and Tammy Stokes. This Article was written with support from a summer research grant provided by Cumberland
School of Law, Samford University, and an honorarium provided by McGeorge School of Law, University of the
Pacific.
1. See Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (1996); see also Stephen J. Ware, Employ-
ment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTA L. REV. 83, 137 n.275 (1996) [hereinafter Employment
Arbitration] (citing cases).
2. I have articulated and defended the contractual approach to arbitration law in three previous articles:
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and UnconscionabilityAfterDoctor'sAssociates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKEFOREST
L. REV. 1001 (1996) [hereinafter Arbitration & Unconscionability]; Employment Arbitration, supra note 1, at 83;
Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Contracting Out of Government's Role in Punishment and
Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529 (1994).
3. A single case implementing the contractual approach, Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20 (1991), has generated a storm of criticism. See Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 1, at 104 nn.102-04
and accompanying text; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1017 (1996). More comprehensive critiques of the
contractual approach make arguments of two sorts. First, are those arguing that the public interest in certain
disputes-typically those involving statutory claims-should preclude enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. See,
e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform,
4 OHIOST.J. ONDISP.RESOL. 157 (1989); Employment Arbitration, supra note 1, at 101-02 nn.92-93. Second, are
those arguing that the contractual approach falls to protect "little guys" from those with "economic power." See,
eg., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. Cr. REV. 331; Jean R. Sterlight,
Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 637 (1996). For a sustained critique of the contractual approach, see TOM CARBONNEAU, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ch. 6 (1997).
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more broadly. They are arguments against allowing ordinary individuals to govern
themselves by contract.
Ordinary individuals, now often called "consumers,"4 do contract. They are, to
some extent, governed by contract law. But the extent to which consumers are free
to contract has shrunk dramatically this century. Much of the law now governing
consumer transactions is anti-contract law. The law governing consumer arbitration
stands out as a noteworthy exception, an island of contract in a sea of anti-contract.
This exceptional nature of consumer arbitration, I suggest, is the starting point for
understanding debate about contemporary arbitration law. In short, debate about the
contractual approach to arbitration law is best understood as part of a broader
debate about the extent to which consumer law should be contract law.
The first Section of this Article will briefly summarize the contractual approach
to arbitration law and criticism of that approach. It will defend the contractual
approach from criticism by Paul Carrington. Section II will put consumer arbitration
in the context of consumer law, generally. It will outline the spread of anti-contract
law in consumer law and contrast it with the law governing consumer arbitration.
The Article will conclude with a plea to keep anti-contract approaches out of
arbitration law and, more broadly, to make contract the central principle throughout
consumer law.
I. THE CoNTRAcTuAL APPROACH AND ITS CRITICS
Over the last twenty years, the United States Supreme Court has drastically
changed arbitration law. The changes have resulted in an arbitration law that is
largely contractual. Many commentators describe these changes to arbitration law
4. It might be preferable to use the term "consumer" to mean an individual who obtains goods and services
for personal, family or household use. This would not, however, define the individuals that critics of the contractual
approach are concerned about. For instance, critics of the contractual approach are concerned about employees and
tenants of residential real estate. Also, critics of the contractual approach are probably not as concerned about
billionaires as about people of ordinary means. Thus, I use the term "consumer" to mean ordinary individuals in
whatever capacity: employee, tenant, buyer of goods, etc. This is consistent with the widespread use of the term
"consumer bankruptcy" to describe individual bankruptcy. See, eg., ELIzABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE
WEsTlROOK, TiE LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDrroRs pt. II (3d ed. 1996).
5. "Anti-contract" law comes in strong and mild forms. The strong form is explained at the start of Part
II.A.I and the mild form is explained at the start of Part II.B.l.a.
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as the worst sort of judicial activism, Justices pursuing their policy preferences
without regard for legislative intent or judicial precedent. 6 That may be true. The
Court's arbitration decisions may be result-oriented, with the intended result being
"conserv[ation] of scarce judicial resources."7 I cannot, however, pretend to know
the Justices' motivations. What I can do is defend their decisions. I have argued
that, with one possible exception, the Court has faithfully applied the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 8 which itself explicitly enacted the contractual approach
to arbitration law.9 Whatever their motivations, the Justices are putting arbitration
law right.
Whether or not the FAA compels the contractual approach to arbitration law,
this approach has become the law of the land.'0 Arbitration cases are now being
decided under the contractual approach. These decisions, in turn, are generating a
storm of academic criticism." Among the critics of the contractual approach to
arbitration law is Paul Carrington. He and Paul Haagen recently published one of
the most comprehensive, insightful and aggressive critiques of the contractual
approach to arbitration law. That article, Contract and Jurisdiction,2 deserves a
reply.
6. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, passim; IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATIoN LAw chs. 10,
11 & 14 (1992) [hereinafterMANEL,AMERICANARBrrRATION]; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping andSlouching
Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 BRoOK. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (1996)
[hereinafter Stempel, Bootstrapping & Slouching] ("arbitration zealots.., including most of the Supreme Court"...
"ride roughshod over individual rights and basic notions of fairness in the heat of pursuing a popular current goal.").
7. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 332. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect
Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33,
123.
8. 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-16 (1994). The one possible exception is the enormously important question of whether
the FAA is a procedural statute governing only in federal court or substantive law governing in all courts and
preempting inconsistent state law. Ian Macneil argues convincingly that the FAA was originally understood to be
a procedural statute governing only in federal court. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION, supra note 6, chs. 9-11
& 14. So the debate is not about original understanding but whether the Supreme Court's changed interpretation
of the FAA is proper in light of developments in the law after the FAA was enacted, namely Erie RR. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945): See Stemlight, supra note 3, at n.385;
Arbitration & Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 1006-08.
9. See Arbitration & Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 1002-06.
10. See generally Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (1996) (establishing the contractual
approach).
11. See discussion supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing several critical analyses of the contractual
approach to arbitration law).These results are also generating some criticism from politicians, particularly in the
employment area. See Employment Arbitration, supra note I, at nn.105-06 and accompanying text.
12. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 331.
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A. Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Carrington and Haagen, like other critics of the contractual approach to arbit-
ration law, focus onpre-dispute arbitration agreements.' 3 A pre-dispute arbitration
agreement is any contract containing a clause obligating the parties to arbitrate,
rather than litigate, disputes arising out of or relating to the contract. In contrast,
there has been little criticism of the contractual approach topost-dispute arbitration
agreements, i.e., contracts to arbitrate a particular dispute that has already arisen
between the parties.
Their discomfort with enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements makes
Carrington and Haagen reactionaries; they sympathize with the way the law used
to be. Prior to enactment of the FAA and other modem arbitration statutes in the
1920's, pre-dispute arbitration agreements were unenforceable. 14 Carrington and
Haagen explain the refusal of pre-1920's courts to enforce pre-dispute arbitration
agreements:
It was... perceived by at least some courts that the existence of genuine
mutual assent was suspect when parties agreed to arbitrate a future dispute,
and that a dispute resolution clause could be a trap for the unwary. As one
court put it: "[b]y first making the contract and then declaring who should
construe it, the strong could oppress the weak, and in effect so nullify the
law as to secure the enforcement of contracts usurious, illegal, immoral, or
contrary to public policy." This view of commercial reality.., led to the
opinion that the best way to assure true assent to arbitration was to afford
a party having promised to arbitrate a future dispute an opportunity to
withdraw assent when a real dispute has arisen and the revoking party is at
last likely to be attentive to the hazards of dispute resolution and
well-advised.15
13. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 7, at 116-19.
14. Prior to the 1920's, an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute was generally enforceable only by the
remedy of nominal money damages, not by the remedy of specific enforcement. IAN R. MACNE[LETAL., FEDERAL
ARBrmATION LAW § 4.3.2.2 (1994) [hereinafter MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBITRATION]. The lack of specific enforce-
ment was crucial because the damages remedy was "largely ineffective." MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION, supra
note 6, at 20.
Alabama is one of a few states still precluding enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, although
this state law is preempted by the FAA. Allied Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 115 S.Ct. 834 (1995).
Carrington & Haagen cite Alabama law as the model. "The most effective way to assure that the arbitration is fair
to both parties is the traditional way that Alabama followed, making the arbitration clause revocable and thus
renegotiable by the parties at a time when the dimensions of their dispute are known and both have consulted
counsel." Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 385.
15. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 340 (quoting Parsons v. Ambos, 48 S.E. 696 (Ga. 1904)).
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Carrington and Haagen make at least two points here. First, is the concern about
"genuine" mutual assent. When a consumer signs a form contract containing an
arbitration clause, has the consumer "genuinely" assented to arbitration? No, is
often the answer, suggest Carrington and Haagen. They contrast the pre-dispute
scenario with post-dispute arbitration agreements, which typically are the product
of "genuine" assent because parties forming such agreements are likely to be atten-
tive to the hazards of dispute-resolution and likely to be well-advised.
As a generalization, it seems uncontroversial that those signing pre-dispute
arbitration agreements tend to be less "attentive" to dispute-resolution than are
those signing post-dispute arbitration agreements. This inattention is understandable
because the arbitration clause is just one of many clauses in the pre-dispute arbit-
ration agreement. That agreement might be for the sale of a car, to open a bank
account, or an employment agreement, to give just three examples. The consumer
is probably less attentive to the arbitration clause than to other contract terms, such
as the price of the car, the fees on the bank account or the wages for employment.
In contrast, the post-dispute arbitration agreement is a contract about dispute-
resolution only, so the consumer signing it is aware that she is obligating herself to
arbitrate. Furthermore, the consumer signing a post-dispute arbitration agreement
is likely advised by a lawyer. The same can rarely be said of the consumer signing
a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
The second point made by Carrington and Haagen is that-by substituting
private, for government, adjudicators-arbitration agreements allow "the strong [to]
oppress the weak, and in effect so nullify the law as to secure the enforcement of
contracts usurious, illegal, immoral, or contrary to public policy. '1 6 Carrington and
Haagen seem to think this point applies only topre-dispute agreements, but I do not
agree that it is so limited. After all, arbitration pursuant to apost-dispute agreement
could also result in enforcement of illegal contracts. 17 The implicit assumption
Carrington and Haagen seem to make is that consumers signing post-dispute
agreements do not agree to "bad" arbitration because they are advised by lawyers
who will tell them to choose litigation instead. In contrast, Carrington and Haagen
assume, consumers signing pre-dispute agreements do not know any better than to
agree to "bad" arbitration. Consumers signing pre-dispute agreements may not
know any better, but their ignorance stems from their inattention to the hazards of
16. Id.
17. The reason arbitration can result in enforcement of illegal contracts is that courts do not closely review
arbitration awards to ensure that arbitrators have correctly applied the law. MACNEIL, FEDERAL ARBrrRATION, supra
note 14, at § 40.7; Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 344-48. Judicial review of awards arising out of post-
dispute arbitration agreements is no more deferential than review of awards arising out of pre-dispute agreements.
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dispute-resolution and lack of counsel, which is Carrington and Haagen's first point.
Thus, the two points collapse into one. The case for denying enforcement to pre-
dispute arbitration agreements rests on the belief that consumers signing such agree-
ments do not "genuinely" assent because they are inattentive to the hazards of
dispute resolution and are unlikely to be well-advised.
These points apply well beyond arbitration agreements. They apply to most,
maybe all, consumer contracts. Consider, as examples, consumer contracts to buy
a new car, to open a bank account, to buy insurance or to lease an apartment. In all
of these contracts, the consumer is unlikely to be "attentive" to more than a few of
the clauses. 8 Most of the "boilerplate" language on the form contract is unlikely to
receive significant attention from the consumer. An arbitration clause is not unusual
in this respect. It is typical. The unusual clause is the one that does receive attention
from the consumer. The arbitration clause is also a typical contract clause in that the
consumer is not apprised about it. The consumer is unlikely to have been well-
advised about any of the other terms in the form contract either. Apparently then,
arguments against the contractual approach to arbitration are actually arguments
against enforcing most of the terms in consumer form contracts.
B. Duress, Unconscionability and Contract Interpretation
Like many critics of the contractual approach to arbitration law, Carrington and
Haagen contend that "contracts of adhesion... lack the characteristics traditionally
providing the moral justification for enforcing the promises they contain."19 As an
example, they cite a bill of lading exempting the carrier from liability for
negligence:
The Court noted that the term was not the product of free exercise of the
right to make enforceable promises; to the contrary, a shipper "prefers to
accept any bill of lading, or to sign any paper, that the carrier presents; and
in most cases, he has no alternative but to do this, or to abandon his busi-
ness." When a contract is imposed in this fictive manner, the Court held,
it should be enforced only if its terms are "just and reasonable.,
20
18. REsTATEmENT(SEcoND)oFCoNTRACrs § 211 cmt. b (1981).
19. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 335. See also Stempel, Bootstrapping & Slouching, supra note
6, at n.8 and accompanying text; Sternlight, supra note 3, at 676 ("While the pure freedom of contract rationale has
some appeal as applied to two entities engaging in an arm's length transaction, it cannot realistically be used to
justify imposing binding arbitration through contracts of adhesion on unwitting consumers.").
20. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 335 (quoting Liverpool & G.W. Steam Co. v. Pheonix Ins. Co.,
129 U.S. 397,441 (1889)).
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Carrington and Haagen argue that, in accepting this contract, the shipper was not
"free," i.e., it had "no alternative;" this contract was "imposed. 21 Carrington and
Haagen appear to make this charge against all form contracts, at least all those
presented "take-it-or-leave-it."2 So when a form contract containing an arbitration
clause is presented to a consumer, the consumer has "no alternative" but to sign it;
the duty to arbitrate is "imposed" on the consumer.
That is wrong. The consumer is free to put the pen down without signing the
form. There is no duress in the typical "adhesion" contract. A consumer who con-
tracts in such circumstances does so voluntarily.23 The form may contain boilerplate
terms which are unenforceable, but that does not make the contract any less
voluntary.24
While Carrington and Haagen seek to bloody form contracts-by impugning
their voluntariness-they do not seek to kill them. Carrington and Haagen
"distinguish contracts of adhesion from real contracts,"5 but they tolerate the
former as a necessary evil.26 They do, however, seek to minimize that evil.
Accordingly, they laud contract doctrines that "permit[] courts to respond flexibly
to the social realities underlying imposed [sic] contracts."'27
The doctrines to which Carrington and Haagen refer are the contractual
approach's way of addressing the concern cited by its critics, consumer inattention
to arbitration clauses in form contracts. Contract law recognizes that consumers are
inattentive to many terms in form contracts. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS explicitly acknowledges that:
A party who makes regular use of a standardized form of agreement does
not ordinarily expect his customers to understand or even to read the
standard terms .... Customers do not in fact ordinarily understand or even
read the standard terms. They trust to the good faith of the party using the
form and to the tacit representation that like terms are being accepted
21. Id.
22. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 334 ("Mhe term 'contract of adhesion' ... applied to agreements
that are not the result of bargaining.).
23. Contracting in the absence of duress is contracting voluntarily. See EmploymentArbitration, supra note
1, at I11 & 120-28.
24. Id The grounds for denying enforcement to certain boilerplate terms might include contract
interpretation doctrines or unconscionability, both of which are discussed below. The point here is that these
doctrines, unlike duress, do not address voluntariness. Unconscionability, in particular, should not be confused with
involuntariness or coercion. See id at 126-28.
25. Id. at 338.
26. Id at 336.
27. Id.
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regularly by others similarly situated. But they understand that they are
assenting to the terms not read or not understood, subject to such
limitations as the law may impose.28
What are these limitations? An important limitation is found in the Restatement
section corresponding to the comment just quoted. Section 211(3) states that the
consumer does not assent to a form contract term if the "other party has reason to
believe that the [consumer] would not have accepted the agreement if he had known
that the agreement contained the particular term. 29 This reasoning protects con-
sumers from much of the risk posed by form contracts.30 The consumer does not
need to worry that the boilerplate on the form contains a term which:
- is "bizarre or oppressive,"
- "eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to," or
- "eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction,"
because such terms are not part of the contract.3'
Related contract law doctrines addressing consumer inattention to form
contracts include the rule of interpretation against the drafter3 2 and the uncon-
scionability doctrine. Unconscionability is often thought of as coming in two forms:
substantive unconscionability and procedural unconscionability. Substantive
unconscionability refers simply to contract terms that are "unreasonably favorable"
to one side.33 Procedural unconscionability deals with the process of contract for-
mation, encompassing "not only the employment of sharp practices and the use of
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 211 cmt. b (1981).
29. Id. § 211 crt. f.
30. Section 211(3) is quite similar to the formulation of Karl Llewellyn, cited with approval by Carrington
& Haagen, supra note 3, at 336. Llewellyn said there was "specific" assent to the "few dickered terms" and
"blanket" assent "to any not unreasonable or indecent term the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms." KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION:
DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1981). In this way, contract law distinguishes
between the form's enforceable terms and its unenforceable ones. For example, regarding form contracts
accompanying a computer or software, it would distinguish between an arbitration clause and a clause obligating
the buyer "to spend the rest of [his] life as a towel boy in Bill Gates's new mansion." Scott Adams, Dilbert,
TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Jan. 14, 1997, at C7, quoted in Stempel, Bootstrapping & Slouching, supra note 6, at
1384 n.8.
Jeffrey Stempel cites the Dilbert cartoon to ridicule cases enforcing arbitration clauses in form contracts
accompanying a computer or software, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997)); ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-52 (7th Cir. 1996), presumably because the consumer does not even receive
the form until she receives (and probably pays for) the product. There is no reason, though, why one cannot
manifest assent to terms she has not seen. Purchasers of insurance, for example, have long done just that. See
JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS ch.8 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
32. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
33. E. ALLAN FARNsWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (2d ed. 1990).
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fine print and convoluted language, but a lack of understanding and an inequality
of bargaining power."'
Most statements of the law of unconscionability now hold that both
procedural and substantive unconscionability are required before courts
will grant relief from a challenged term. Judicial decisions have not con-
sistently followed this principle, however, and somd courts have suggested
a vaguely mathematical metaphor in which a large amount of one type of
unconscionability can make up for only a small amount of the other.35
The unconscionability doctrine, and the contract interpretation doctrines dis-
cussed above, do apply to arbitration agreements.36 An arbitration clause running
afoul of these doctrines will not be enforceable under current arbitration law. Yet,
this does not satisfy critics of the contractual approach. They prefer an anti-contract
approach. The anti-contract approach would, in its strong form, deny enforcement
to all pre-dispute arbitration agreements involving consumers,37 or, in its mild form,
enforce some such agreements, but not as many as the contractual approach
enforces.3' The next Section of this Article will contrast the strong and mild forms
of the anti-contract approach with the contractual approach. First, though, it is
necessary to respond to an argument that the anti-contract approach, even in its
strong form, is actually consistent with contract law.
Carrington and Haagen praise the strong anti-contract approach of denying
enforcement to all pre-dispute arbitration agreements involving consumers,39 not
just those running afoul of contract law doctrines. In other words, they praise a
blanket rule precluding enforcement of arbitration clauses against consumers and
attack the contractual approach of case-by-case application of contract doctrines.
Strangely, they assert that disregarding contract doctrines in favor of a blanket rule
against enforcement is itself an application of contract doctrine. They argue that
denying enforcement to all pre-dispute arbitration agreements is "justifiable as an
34. 1L See generally RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 208 including comment.
35. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionabiliy and Related Doctrines, 60
U. CHI.L.REV. 1, 17(1993).
36. Unconscionability's application to arbitration is addressed at length in one of my previous articles. See
Arbitration & Unconscionability, supra note 2, passim.
37. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 125 (opposing enforcement of "adhesive pre-dispute arbitration
contracts").
38. See infra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (discussing the "knowing and voluntary" standard).
39. They never come right out and say this. They make the "genuine assent" argument (quoted above)
against enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 340. Then they
acknowledge the virtues of enforceability to "foster interstate commerce." Id. Then they argue that statutes, like
the FAA, making arbitration agreements enforceable were intended to apply only to agreements between businesses,
or "parties of reasonably equal strength and sophistication." Id. at 340-42. It appears, therefore, that Carrington and
Haagen may tolerate enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements between businesses, but oppose enforce-
ment in consumer cases. Accord Schwartz, supra note 7, at 75-81 (citing legislative history of FAA).
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application of elementary contract doctrine requiring comprehending mutual
assent."49 There is, however, no contract doctrine requiring "comprehending"
mutual assent. There is not even a contract doctrine requiring mutual assent.
The requirement to form a contract is not that parties actually assent to its
terms. The requirement is that they take actions-such as signing their
names on a document or saying certain words-that would lead a reason-
able person to believe that they have assented to the terms of the contract.
In other words, contract formation technically requires, not mutual assent,
but mutual manifestations of assent. Contract law does this to satisfy "the
inescapable need of individuals in society and those trying to administer a
coherent legal system to rely on appearances-to rely on an individual's
behavior that apparently manifests their assent to a transfer of entitle-
ments. ' 4
Just as the inescapable need to rely on appearances requires objective rules for
contract formation, it similarly requires objective rules for contract interpretation.
Those rules include the one in § 211(3) providing that a consumer does not assent
to a form contract term if the "the other party has reason to believe that the
[consumer] would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the
agreement contained the particular term. 42 This rule, it should be emphasized,
requires courts to assess what the drafting party has "reason to believe." The con-
sumer's actual subjective assent, or lack thereof, is irrelevant.
On this point, Carrington and Haagen make arguments that sweep far beyond
the context of arbitration. Their arguments rest on the subjective theory of contract
and cannot be accepted without undermining the prevailing objective theory of con-
tract.43 As noted above, Carrington and Haagen worry that there is not "genuine"
assent to an arbitration clause in a typical form contract.4 On the same page of their
article, they yearn for "true" assent, and "comprehending" assent.45 They are so
attached to the subjective theory of contract that they even refer to "true contracts
embodying a meeting of minds."' Even if minds exist, 47 they do not have to meet
to form a contract. Contract law does not call for inquiry into whether assent is
40. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 340.
41. Ware, Employment Arbitration, supra note 1, at 113-14 (quoting Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory
of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269,301 (1986)).
42. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
43. "By the end of the nineteenth century, the objective theory had become ascendant and courts generally
accept it today." FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 3.6.
44. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 340.
45. See Stempel, Bootstrapping & Slouching, supra note 6, at 1385 (demonstrating that courts enforce
arbitration agreements "that appear to lack real consent").
46. Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 336.
47. Compare, e.g., DANIELDENNETCONSCIOUSNESSEXPLAINED (1991), with DAVID HODGSONTHEMIND
MATrES: CONSCIOUSNESS AND CHOICE IN A QUANTUM WORLD (1991).
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"genuine," "true," or "comprehending. '' g Courts cannot peer into consumers' heads
to determine whether these tests are met.4 9 They can, however, ask whether a rea-
sonable person in the drafting party's position would perceive the consumer's con-
duct to be a manifestation of assent to particular terms.50 Carrington and Haagen,
and other critics of current arbitration law, seem to reject that test." To do so is to
reject what has been a fundamental part of contract law for a century, the objective
theory.
Once the objective theory of contract is accepted, one must reject the notion
that denying enforcement to all pre-dispute consumer arbitration agreements is
consistent with contract law.52 Rather, it is the strong "anti-contract" approach to
arbitration law.
11. ARBITRATION LAW IN THE CONSUMER LAW CONTEXT
Arbitration law, including the arbitration law governing consumers, is largely
contractual. Advocates of the anti-contract approach to arbitration law have not suc-
48. An exception might be made for courts applying the unconscionability doctrine in a particularly
aggressive way. These courts could be engaged in the metaphysically-dubious enterprise of trying to determine
whether the consumer's assent is "genuine," "true," or "comprehending." Even this approach, however, because
it is performed on a case-by-case analysis, differs from a blanket rule against enforcement of consumer arbitration
agreements.
49. See, e.g., SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS ON LAW, MORALITY, AND POLITICS 23 (William P. Baumgarth &
Richard J. Regan, SJ., eds., 1988) (SUMMATHEOL GICA I-It, qu. 91, art. 4) ("[M]an can make laws in those matters
of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements that are hidden but
only of exterior acts which appear.").
50. RESTATEMENT(SEcOND)OFCONTRACTS § 211(3) (1981).
51. See, e.g., Stempel, Bootstrapping & Slouching, supra note 6, at 1384 n.8, 1387 (attacking the
"unrealistic, formal and narrow view of contract consent and meaning demonstrated in recent cases" and their
"wooden, Lochnerized version of contracting."). These attacks seem to rest on a subjective theory of contract, with
"formal" and "wooden" being derogatory equivalents of "objective." See also Stemlight, supra note 3, at 675-77.
Jean Sternlight quickly rejects a contractual argument on grounds relating to the absence of actual or knowledgeable
assent by the consumer "[O]ne cannot with a straight face justify enforcement of form arbitration agreements
imposed [sic] by sellers on consumers on the ground that the consumers actually accepted the contract with
knowledge of those terms." Id. at 676-77. She does not address a contractual argument, like the one in this Article,
based on the prevailing objective theory of contract. She does address arguments that, as cbmpared to litigation,
arbitration is more efficient under either the Paretian or Kaldor-Hicks standards. Id. at 677-93 (Paretian); ia, at 693-
97 (Kaldor-Hicks). These are utilitarian arguments for arbitration, whether or not the parties have consented to it,
rather than a contractualist argument which favors arbitration only when, and precisely because, the parties have
consented to it.
52. Under the contractual approach, most such agreements are enforceable. The typical arbitration clause
will survive an unconscionability challenge. See Arbitration & Unconscionability, supra note 2, passim. There will
not be many cases in which section 211(3) will exclude the arbitration clause. Section 211(3) will only exclude the
arbitration clause if the consumer can persuade a court that she would not have signed the contract had she known
it contained the arbitration clause because that clause rarely
- is "bizarre or oppressive," or
- "eviscerates the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to," or
- "eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction."
1998 / Consumer Arbitration As Exceptional Consumer Law
ceeded in changing the law to their liking.53 The picture is quite different elsewhere
in the law governing consumers. Anti-contract approaches to consumer law have
been enacted throughout this century, especially since the 1960's. Anti-contract law
comes in two forms. The strong form disables contract altogether by making rights
inalienable. The mild form hampers contract by adding barriers to enforcement of
agreements beyond those found in contract law. Both forms of anti-contract law are
widespread in consumer law, but neither appears in the arbitration law governing
consumers.
A. Inalienability, the Strong Form of Anti-Contract Law
Contract is a process of alienating rights.54 Consider, as two examples, my right
to possess the watch on my wrist and my right not to be punched in the nose. Both
of these rights are alienable; I can sell these rights through contract. I can make a
contract to sell my watch and, when that contract is performed, I will no longer have
a right to possess the watch.5 I will have alienated that right. Similarly, I can make
53. Much state arbitration law is anti-contract but that law is preempted by the FAA. Arbitration &
Unconscionability, supra note 2, at 1011-12 & n.72.
54. See RPCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOmwC ANALYSIS OF LAW 31 (4th ed. 1992) ("[Trhe law of contracts [is]
concerned with facilitating the voluntary movement of property rights into the hands of those who value them
most."); Employment Arbitration, supra note I (quoting Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 269,292 (1986), "Contract law concerns ways in which rights are transferred or alienated."). This
conception of contract is "part of a more general theory of individual [rights] that specifies how resources may be
rightly acquired (property law), used (tort law), and transferred (contract law)." Id. Accord Richard A. Epstein, The
Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL. STUD. 253 (1980).
mhe function of the law is essentially threefold, where for each function there is an associated branch of the
law. The first function is to determine the original property holdings of given individuals, including rights
over one's own body. Such is governed by the law of property, especially with the rules for the acquisition
of unowned things. The second is the law of contracts (including conveyancing) which governs cooperative
efforts among individuals and exchanges of things that are already owned. The third is the protection of
persons and property (and their methods of transfer) from the aggression ofthird parties; such is the traditional
function of the law of torts.
Id. at 255. Accord POSNER, supra. Not only does conveyancing belong in the contract branch, but so do commercial
devices, such as negotiable instruments and letters of credit, which are not, technically, contracts.
In conceiving of contract as a process of alienating rights, I choose the word "alienating" instead of
"transferring" or "waiving." Alienating rights usually means transferring them to someone but sometimes it means
extinguishing them. See, eg., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPEMRr: NOMOS XXII 69-70
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman, eds. 1980) (creation oftrust extinguishes right to leave land idle). Waiver,
in its broadest definition, is synonymous with alienation, "relinquishment of the right." Edward L. Rubin, Toward
a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REV. 478, 484 (1981). But waiver is typically used with a narrower
meaning. See id. at 522 ("There is no logical reason why an obligation created by contract cannot be described as
waiver as well--the waiver of one's right to be free of such an obligation. This is not the common usage and Corbin
counsels against it.").
55. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1995).
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a contract to enter a boxing match and I will no longer have the right to be free of
a punch in the nose.56 1 will have alienated that right by contract.'
1. Consumer Law, Generally
While contract is a process of alienating rights, not all rights are alienable.
Some rights cannot be contracted away.58 Law rendering rights inalienable is strong
"anti-contract" law because it completely disables contract as a process of
alienating rights. It removes rights from the realm of contract by making them
inalienable. Such law has assumed a major presence in the law governing
consumers. Over the last century, and especially since the 1960's, consumers have
been granted numerous inalienable rights.59 These rights pertain to a wide range of
consumer transactions including those for goods, real estate, credit, services,
insurance, and employment.
a. Goods
Sales of goods to consumers are now governed by the tort law of "strict product
liability." Consumers have a right that "products" not be "in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property." 6 This right is
inalienable; disclaimers of it will not be enforced.6'
56. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp.
1988).
57. Contract law's fundamental doctrines relating to contract formation, interpretation and defenses to
enforcement specify the process which must occur to alienate rights by contract.
58. Some rights may be alienated by one process, but not another. For example, some rights may be given
away but not contracted away. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1850
(1987).
59. DOUGLAS WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER LAW xxvi (1991).
60. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) oFToRTs § 402A (1975).
61. Id. cmt. m (stating that "[t]he consumer's cause of action... is not affected by any disclaimer or other
agreement"). See KEETON, supra note 56, § 97. This inalienability is preserved in the proposed revision to the
Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT OFTHE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18 (Proposed Final Draft,
Apr. 1, 1997).
Other law governing sales of goods, rather than giving an inalienable right to consumers, gives no right at all
to consumers. This law consists of the rules promulgated or enforced by administrative agencies such as the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 16 C.FR. § 1000-61, the Food and Drug Administration, 21 C.F.R. § 1 et
seq., and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 49 C.F.R. § 500-94. These rules often prescribe
standards for goods sold to consumers. Those manufacturing or selling sub-standard goods are typically subject to
administrative penalties, rather than a private right of action by injured consumers. See, e.g., The Flammable Fabrics
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1204, 16 C.FR. §§ 1608-1616. Thus the right to goods meeting the standards is a right of
the administrative agency, not of the consumer.
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b. Real Estate
Strict liability in tort has been extended beyond goods to real property when the
land includes a building constructed by the seller.62 Another inalienable right
typically present in real property law is the residential tenant's right to "habitable"
premises.63
c. Credit and Related Transactions
Just as the consumer's right to non-dangerous goods is inalienable, so is the
consumer's right to non-dangerous credit. "[I]n the consumer market we have
restricted the availability of certain products because it is thought that the only
effective protection of the consumer is to ban the product completely.
Credit-particularly high price, high risk credit-might be similarly viewed."
6
Usury laws, that is, interest rate ceilings, are "in effect, a ban on unsafe credit."
65
Other "unsafe" contract terms with respect to which the law prohibits alienability
include: cross-collateral clauses,6 confessions of judgment,67 assignments of
wages," waivers of exemptions, 69 waivers of defenses,70 and non-possessory, non-
purchase-money security interests in household goods.7'
d. Services
Consumers purchase many services. The consumer of services has, in addition
to any contractual rights, a tort law right that the services be performed in a non-
negligent manner.72 This right is often inalienable. 73
62. KEETON, supra note 56, § 104A.
63. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973) (providing that an "implied warranty
... that the premises are fit for human occupation ... cannot be waived by any provision in the lease or rental
agreement").
64. George . Wallace, The Uses of Usury: Low Rate Ceilings Reexamined. 56 B.U. L. REv. 451, 458-59
(1976).
65. Id. at 497.
66. See MICHAELM. GREENEJELD, CONSUMER TRANSACrONS ch. 13 (2d ed. 1991).
67. IL
68. ld.
69. I1. at 636.
70. Il at 660-77.
71. 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (1997).
72. KEETON, supra note 56, § 92.
73. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-103 (1995) (providing "a bank's responsibility for its ... failure to exercise
ordinary care"); Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and
Providers, 49 LAW & CorrEmn'. PROBs. 173, 184 (1986) (stating that "courts have been extremely hostile to"
patients' releases of hospitals and physicians for future negligence).
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e. Insurance
Insurance is purchased by large numbers of consumers. Just as some consumer
rights regarding tangible products are inalienable, so are consumer rights regarding
insurance. "In some states, statutes prescribe standard terms either for some types
of insurance or for particular coverage provisions. 74 The policyholder rights
granted by these prescribed policy terms are inalienable because the consumer
could not buy insurance without these terms.
f Employment
An employee's right to join a labor union is inalienable; so-called "yellow dog"
contracts are unenforceable under federal labor law.7' Also inalienable are em-
ployees' rights to be free of discrimination by race, sex, and so on.76
2. Arbitration Law Governing Consumers
In contrast to the inalienable rights so common in much of consumer law,
arbitration law permits the consumer to alienate her rights. The contractual
approach to arbitration law, like contract law generally, fosters alienability. The
particular rights it makes alienable are those enforced in court, but not (necessarily)
in arbitration. These include rights specified by rules of civil procedure and
evidence, and the right to a government-selected adjudicator (judge or jury") to
decide questions of fact.78 I shall refer to this set of rights as the "right to
government adjudication."79 An enforceable arbitration agreement alienates this
right to government adjudication and creates, instead, a right to private adjudi-
cation. By enforcing such agreements, the contractual approach to arbitration law
makes the right to government adjudication alienable. Strong critics of the con-
tractual approach, like Carrington and Haagen, attack this alienability. They praise
a rule which would make the right to government adjudication inalienable, at least
74. ROBERTE. KEETON&ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 2.8(b) (1988).
75. 29 U.S.C.A. § 103 (1994); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941). Thus, all of labor
law, despite its pro-contract superstructure built around collective bargaining agreements, is based on an anti-
contract substructure of inalienability.
76. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINATION LAW § 5.84 (1988).
77. Litigants, through their attorneys, often play some role in selecting which individuals will serve asjurors
on their case, although the government drives this selection process by creating eligibility standards for jurors and
encouraging potential jurors to actually serve. All this aside, the reason juries are government-selected adjudicators
is that government law selects juries, if not always individual jurors, as the finders-of-fact in cases at law. In such
cases, if the parties do not agree on a finder-of-fact, it will be a jury.
78. Questions of law are more complicated. See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text (setting forth
the knowing and voluntary legal approach).
79. Edward Rubin calls it "the right to judicial adjudication." Rubin, supra note 54, at 516.
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when the holder of that right is a consumer. ° That would be the effect of a blanket
rule against enforcement of consumer arbitration agreements.
A clarification is now required. The rule praised by Carrington and Haagen
would not make the consumer's right to government adjudication permanently
inalienable. That rule would make it temporarily inalienable, inalienable unless and
until there is a dispute.8 In other words, Carrington and Haagen confine their anti-
contract agenda to pre-dispute arbitration agreements. They have no objection to
alienation of the right to government adjudication in a post-dispute arbitration
agreement. Thus, there are three possibilities with regard to the right to government
adjudication: (1) alienable (the contractual approach of current law); (2) inalienable
unless and until a dispute arises (the approach of pre-1920's arbitration law); and
(3) permanently inalienable (the approach of one who would deny enforcement
even to post-dispute arbitration agreements82).
The alienability concept facilitates a comparison between the contractual
approach to arbitration law and the strong anti-contract approach of denying
enforcement to pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Carrington and Haagen
commend the strong anti-contract approach precisely because it would make the
consumer's right to government adjudication inalienable unless and until a dispute
arises.83 That inalienability would "protect" consumers who are inattentive to
arbitration clauses in their contracts because those consumers would retain the right
to government adjudication. To put it another way, those consumers would be able
to avoid the duty to arbitrate without, as current law requires, having to satisfy any
contract law doctrine.4 While this sounds great for consumers, it is not. The
interests of consumers as a group are better served by the contractual approach's
pro-alienability rule that a consumer's pre-dispute arbitration agreement is
enforceable absent a contract law defense.85
The great virtue of the contractual approach to arbitration law is the great virtue
of contract generally: it permits the alienation of rights with, and only with, the
voluntary consent of the rights-holder. It is easy to see why one would not want
alienation of her rights to occur without her voluntary consent. It may be harder to
80. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 340 (noting that relevant parties would "never come right
out and say this").
81. In this regard, the rule praised by Carrington and Haagen would treat the right to government
adjudication like the right to alimony or maintenance upon divorce. The right to alimony or maintenance was, until
quite recently, inalienable at the time of marriage, HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN
THE UNITED STATES 6 (1988), but became alienable once a dispute arose. Courts increasingly are holding the right
to alimony or maintenance alienable at the time of marriage. Id. at 7-8 (discussing Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381
(Fla. 1970)).
82. This approach would also seem to preclude enforcement of settlement agreements and releases. Such
documents purport to alienate the right to government adjudication.
83. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 340.
84. See supra Part LB (analyzing the contractual approach to arbitration).
85. Section 2 of the FAA makes pre-dispute arbitration agreements enforceable "save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1994).
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see the benefit of being able to alienate rights; we typically want, all other things
being equal, to retain our rights. What is the benefit of being able to alienate rights?
Perhaps a sufficient explanation is that it is essential to freedom or autonomy.
8 6
Alienable rights allow one the freedom to choose whether to retain, transfer or
extinguish the right. Inalienable rights permit no such choice.~'
Another benefit of being able to alienate rights by contract is that one obtains
consideration, a quid pro quo, for those rights. Contract is a process of exchange.
People contract, i.e., voluntarily consent to alienation of some of their rights, to
obtain other rights in exchange. This process of exchange is tremendously bene-
ficial; it is what makes both parties to a contract better off than they were without
the contract. Voluntary exchange creates value because each party is surrendering
rights she values less than those she receives in exchange. 8 This value-creation is
prohibited by inalienability rules.
Carrington and Haagen, like other critics of the contractual approach, do not see
it that way. They denigrate those with a "simple faith in" or "blind commitment to"
freedom of contract.89 They assert that "Contract is not merely a source of economic
power, but it is also a deployment of that power that can effect a transfer of wealth
from the weak to the strong."9 They see consumer contracts, and specifically con-
sumer arbitration agreements, not as win-win exchanges, but as a means by which
those with "economic power" prey on those lacking such power.91 In short, they see
contract as exploitation.
It is. Companies using arbitration clauses are exploiting consumers. Pre-dispute
arbitration agreements are exploitation. But they are only in the sense that all con-
tractual exchange is exploitation: X exploits Y' s desire for something X has in order
to get something from Y, and Y does the converse. In an arbitration agreement, the
86. See, e.g., ALANWERTHEIMER, COERCION 19 (1987) (citing Charles Fried, Is Liberty Possible, in TANNER
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES (1982), for the proposition that "the ability to obligate oneself by creating a binding
contract is an important aspect of our freedom").
87. "A person whose right is inalienable does not enjoy more prerogatives than a person whose right is
alienable. On the contrary, he enjoys one fewer since he cannot get rid of those he has." DIANA T. MEYERS,
INALENABLE RIGHTS: A DEFENSE 7 (1985).
88. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 76 (1995) ("[A]II voluntary
exchanges are positive-sum games for the participants. Exchange does not merely transfer physical or intangible
assets. It increases human satisfaction by matching assets with the persons who value them most.").
89. Carrington & Kaagen, supra note 3, at 334. Along these lines, they ridicule the "dogma" of law and
economics, and refer to it as "Darwinian law-and-economics." Id. at 338, 388.
90. Id. at 334. They cite no authority for the proposition that contract "can effect a transfer of wealth from
the weak to the strong." However, they cite RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29 (3d ed. 1986)
for the proposition that contract is "a deployment of [economic] power." I do not see any basis in Posner's work
for this citation. The only statement on the cited page relating to contracts states that "the law of contracts [is]
concerned with facilitating the voluntary movement of property rights into the hands of those who value them
most"
91. "Predation" might even be the theme of Contract and Jurisdiction. Carrington & Haagen use the words
"prey," "predatory" and "predation" a total of six times in the article. Over and over again, the reader is presented
with the image of evil, powerful monied interests preying on helpless, innocent consumers.
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company is exploiting the consumer's desire for something the company has in
order to get, among other things, a promise to arbitrate.92 And the consumer is
exploiting the company's desire for something the consumer has (typically money)
in order to get something from the company. Exploitation, in this sense, is present
in almost every contract. Contractualists usually call it "consideration," "bargain,"
or "exchange"--words with more positive connotations than "exploitation."
Whatever one calls it, it is wonderful. Without it, we would be living in caves and
eating only what we could kill.93
These general points about contracts apply to arbitration agreements in
particular. Under the contractual approach to arbitration law, one retains the right
to government adjudication unless one voluntarily consents to alienate it. The
contractual approach provides the freedom to choose whether to retain or alienate
this right. This empowers parties to make legally-binding promises to arbitrate, and
that enables parties to obtain rights they might not otherwise be able to acquire.
For example, a consumer might be able to acquire rights to a fully-loaded
Toyota Corolla for $20,000 if the consumer makes a legally-binding promise to
arbitrate any dispute relating to the sale. If the consumer could not alienate the right
to government adjudication, that is, if pre-dispute arbitration agreements were un-
enforceable, the seller might not agree to sell the fully-loaded Corolla for $20,000. 9'
The seller might agree to sell that car for a higher price, or might agree to sell a
lesser car for $20,000, but these possibilities serve only to confirm that there may
be a quidpro quo for a legally-binding promise to arbitrate. 95
92. Ofcourse, the company is also getting money, or some other consideration, which it probably cares more
about than arbitration. So the company is exploiting the consumer's desire for something the company has in order
to get the purchase price, or some other consideration, at least as much as to get a promise to arbitrate.
93. Exchange is essential to the division of labor, we can live without producing all of our own food,
clothing and shelter only if we can obtain those things from others. And it is this process, more than anything else,
which is credited with raising living standards. See, e.g., JAMES D. GWARtTNEY & RICHARD L. STROUP, ECONOMICS:
PRIvAEAND PuBliC CHoIcE 46 (7th ed. 1995) ("It is difficult to exaggerate the gains derived from specialization,
division of labor, and exchange in accordance with the law of comparative advantage. These factors are the primary
source of our modern standard of living.").
94. The seller might anticipate that its dispute-resolution costs will be lower if its disputes go to arbitration,
not litigation. Whether a company's dispute-resolution costs will in fact be lower under arbitration would depend
on: (1) Whether arbitration clauses affect the number of claims asserted by or against the company, (2) whether
arbitration affects the outcomes (adjudications and settlements) of those claims actually asserted, and (3) whether
arbitration affects the costs of getting to those results, e.g., legal fees. See, e.g., Stemlight, supra note 3, at 680-86.
95. Assuming that enforceable arbitration clauses lower sellers' dispute-resolution costs, not all of these
savings will, economic theory predicts, be retained by sellers in the form of higher profits. Overtime, competition.
will force sellers to pass on to consumers some of the savings in the form of lower prices or some other change
favoring consumers. As two economists put it,
firms in a purely competitive industry must earn the normal rate of return, and only the normal rate, before
long-run equilibrium can be attained. If economic profit is present, new firms will enter the industry, and the
current producers will have an incentive to expand the scale of their operations. This will lead to an increase
in supply, placing downward pressure on prices.
GWARTNEY & STROUP, supra note 93, at 541. Accord ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE &
PRODUCTION 215 (1983) (differences in profits eliminated by competition).
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Under the contractual approach to arbitration law, consumers can make legally-
binding, pre-dispute promises to arbitrate. In other words, the consumer's right to
government adjudication is alienable. This empowers any and all consumers to get
consideration for that right. If the consumer's right to government adjudication was
inalienable unless and until a dispute occurred, then only those consumers with a
dispute could get consideration for that right. The vast majority of consumers, those
who never have a dispute relating to the contract, would lack the power to obtain
consideration by making a legally-binding promise to arbitrate. Here then, is the
case for the contractual approach. It empowers all consumers, not just those with
a dispute, to get consideration for the right to government adjudication. It provides
freedom of choice to all consumers, not just those with a dispute.
B. Mild Forms of Anti-Contract Law
1. Mandatory Disclosure
a. Consumer Law, Generally
I have just contrasted the alienability fostered by the contractual approach to
arbitration law with the inalienability so common elsewhere in consumer law.
Arbitration law does not, however, contain the only alienable consumer rights.
Consumers are free to alienate many of their rights.96 Some of these rights are
alienable by contract. Others are alienable only if some more elaborate process than
contracting has occurred. This latter category, permitting alienation but requiring
more than contract to effect it, is the mild form of "anti-contract" law.
This argument does not rest on the assumption that consumers typically understand, or even notice, arbitration
clauses. The argument assumes that firms are alert to economic profits, not that consumers are alert to the arbitration
clauses which cause those profits. The increase in output attracted by economic profits is what lowers prices. As
a result, consumers get a combination of lower prices and arbitration clauses. Would consumers prefer the only
possible alternative combination-higher prices and no arbitration clauses-ifthey were more knowledgeable about
arbitration clauses? See, eg., Stermlight, supra note 3, at 689. Perhaps, but that is just speculation.
This speculation is central to the more sophisticated arguments against enforcement of form contract terms.
The argument is essentially that "the parties will enter into the wrong contract." Id..The wrong contract will be too
harsh to the consumer with respect to terms about which consumers are often ignorant, such as arbitration, and too
favorable to the consumer with respect to those terms, such as price, about which consumers are typically
knowledgeable. Id. Competition focuses too much on the former and not enough on the latter.
There are at least three counter-arguments. First, the "wrong contract" argument undermines the consensual
foundation of contract. Contract law properly enforces the terms the parties did agree to, not the ones they "would
have" agreed to under hypothetical circumstances. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default
Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992). Second, how does a court determine with any precision
what terms the parties "would have" agreed to under those hypothetical circumstances? Finally, a justification is
required for the goal of equalizing information. How is the case for equalization stronger with respect to information
than with respect to other forms of property? If the drafting party has greater information about contract terms than
the consumer, why should not the drafting party reap any benefits derived from that disparity?
96. As a generalization, it is probably safe to say that all rights which the law does not expressly make
inalienable are alienable. For examples of alienable rights, see Rubin, supra note 54, at 521.
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Anti-contract law requirements for alienating rights vary. A typical requirement
is that the consumer be given certain information. These "mandatory disclosure"
laws are themselves restrictions on alienability because they make inalienable the
consumer's right to certain information. 97 But they are typically treated as a separate
category of consumer "protection," as less severe restrictions on the consumer's
freedom of choice than making rights (to things other than information)
inalienable.98
Some mandatory disclosure law is tort law. The tort of deceit (fraud) has
expanded beyond merely prohibiting misrepresentations to imposing affirmative
duties to disclose information to consumers in many situations." Similarly, a seller
of goods may be liable in tort for negligently falling to warn the consumer about a
risk or hazard related to the product.'0° Other mandatory disclosure law relating to
goods is promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission,"'1 by the States in their
"little FTC acts,"' 02 and by a host of other statutes.10 3 A tremendous volume of man-
datory disclosure law relates to securities,'0 credit,'
05 and other financial matters.10
97. All decisions are made with "incomplete" information because no one is omniscient. Thus, when making
any choice-whether to buy a certain car, or marry a certain person-one must first choose what information to
acquire before making the choice. Sometimes one regrets making a choice on "too little" information. Conversely,
it is also possible to overinvest in the acquisition of information. More information is not always better because it
comes at a cost of time or money and the additional information may not turn out to be worth that additional cost.
Who is to say what information a consumer should acquire before making a decision? Contract law leaves that up
to the consumer who can decide how much time and money to invest in the acquisition of information. Mandatory
disclosure laws take that discretion away from the consumer. Far from fostering autonomy, mandatory disclosure
laws are "parentalist" restrictions on autonomy.
Mandatory disclosure laws may appear to provide "free" information to the consumer by imposing the costs
of disclosure on the otherparty to the transaction. Some of those costs will, however, be passed on to the consumer;
how much depends on the elasticities of demand for, and supply of, the goods covered by the mandatory disclosure
requirement. See, eg., GWARiNEY & STROUP, supra note 93, at 481-85.
98. See, eg., JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW CASES AND MATERIALs 2 ("A primary level of
attack on any perceived pattern of consumer abuse... is to regulate the disclosure of information to consumers ....
The problem-solver soon learns that disclosure does not eliminate all problems and that more direct regulation of
abuses is necessary.").
99. KEEM N, supra note 56, § 106.
100. Id. § 96(2).
101. The FTC has a statutory directive prevent to "unfair and deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce." 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1994). See 16 C.ER. § 429 (1997) (Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales);
16 C.F.R. § 444 (1997) (Credit Practices; 16 C.F.R. § 455 (1996) (Used Motor Vehicles).
102. See MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS 107 (2d ed. 1991).
103. See, e.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-92; Fair Packaging and Labeling
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-61; Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-95; Magnuson-Moss Consumer
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12; Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901-2012;
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1261-78; Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-41.
104. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a-z (West 1997).
105. Truth In Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1681t (West 1998), Consumer Leasing, 12 C.F.R. § 213
(West 1997); Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (West 1997).
106. See, e.g., Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693; 12 C.F.R. Part 205 (1997) (Regulation E).
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b. Arbitration Law Governing Consumers
While the law governing consumers has many disclosure requirements, no such
requirement appears in the arbitration law governing consumers. The contractual
approach to arbitration law, like contract law generally, requires no disclosure.
Mandatory disclosure in the arbitration context was the subject of a recent
Supreme Court case, Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto.'07 The case involved
a franchise for a Subway restaurant in Montana. The franchisees, the Casarottos,
sued the franchisor, DA. DAI successfully moved the trial court for a stay of the
suit based on the franchise agreement's arbitration clause.'l 8 The Supreme Court of
Montana overturned the stay. It did so in reliance on the following Montana statute:
"Notice that a contract is subject to arbitration.., shall be typed in underlined
capital letters on the first page of the contract; and unless such notice is displayed
thereon, the contract may not be subject to arbitration."'" The franchise agreement
did not comply with this statute because the arbitration clause was on page nine and
in ordinary type.1
The Montana statute is a modest disclosure requirement. It merely requires a
notice on the first page of the contract. It does not require that the consumer receive
any explanation of what "arbitration" means, nor does it require the consumer to
separately sign or initial the arbitration clause. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court rightly held that the Montana statute is preempted by the FAA's
command that arbitration agreements be enforced "save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.""' The Montana statute
"conditions the enforceability of arbitration agreements on compliance with a
special notice requirement not applicable to contracts generally."'"12 In other words,
the Montana statute is preempted because it creates a ground for the revocation of
an arbitration agreement-failure to include a capitalized, underlined page one
notice-that does not "exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."'
13
107. 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
108. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 933 (Mont. 1994), rev'd sub nom.; Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (1996).
109. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995) (repealed 1997). This statute was repealed by the Montana
legislature after the Supreme Court held that it was preempted by the FAA.
110. Doctor's Assocs., 116 S. Ct. at 1653.
111. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1990).
112. Doctor's Assocs., 116 S. Ct. at 1656.
113. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1970).
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2. "Knowing and Voluntary"
a. The Proposals
Doctor's Associates establishes that disclosure requirements and other mild
anti-contract law will not become part of arbitration law unless Congress amends
the FAA. Calls fer such an amendment have begun. These proposals would allow
consumers to alienate the right to government adjudication, but only if some more
elaborate process than contracting has occurred. The details of this process vary
depending upon who is proposing it. In general, the process would seek to ensure
that the consumer "knowingly and voluntarily" agrees to arbitrate. For instance,
Jean Sternlight states:
The position taken by the Montana Supreme Court in Doctor's Associates
with respect to preemption under the FAA was correct, and it ought to have
been affirmed by the Supreme Court. Now that the Court has taken the
extreme position of voiding all protective state legislation, Congress should
amend the FAA to effectively reverse the Court's ruling, protect weaker
parties, and ensure the Constitutionality of the FAA. Specifically, while
states should notbe permitted to prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements
altogether, they should be allowed to enact legislation designed to ensure
that agreements are entered knowingly and voluntarily.!
14
Other commentators have proposed a similar standard."' Some suggest that a
"knowing and voluntary" standard is constitutionally required because it is the
standard for waiver of all constitutional rights and an arbitration agreement waives
the right to a jury trial. 1 6 This constitutional argument has not yet been directly
114. Sternlight, supra note 3, at 707. See also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 389-90 (suggesting
avenues for states confined by Doctor's Associates).
115. See Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public Law Disputes, 1995
U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 652 (1995) ("Because the employee-as a cost of securing efficient resolution of claims-is
typically required to forgo such statutory rights as jury trial (and possibly also expansive statutory remedies), the
courts should apply the usual standard for enforcing waivers of statutory rights: the waiver must be explicit,
knowing, and voluntary.").
See also Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TJL. L. REV. 1377, 1434-35 (1991)
[hereinafter Stempel, A Better Approach]. Stempel's five proposed grounds for avoiding arbitration agreements
(Blameless Ignorance, Dirty-Dealing, Inescapable Adhesion, Substantive Unconscionability, and Defective Agency)
seem to put his approach in the "knowing and voluntary" camp. Id. at 1434-35.
116. See Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1335, 1352 n.63 (1996) ("Outside of the arbitration context, courts require a 'knowing and intentional' waiver
of the right to ajury trial. Relevant factors include the clarity and prominence with which the language is expressed,
the sophistication of the parties, whether they are represented by counsel, and their relative bargaining power.");
Stempel, Bootstrapping & Slouching, supra note 6, at 1389-92. See generally Rubin, supra note 54, at 545 ("the
contract standard cannot be used to justify those waivers that involve constitutional rights since such rights
necessarily take precedence over the contract policy of honoring private agreements"). See also Jean Stemlight,
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addressed by the Supreme Court but acceptance of the argument would require
reversal of Casarotto and other cases implementing the contractual approach. It
would require a holding that the FAA is unconstitutional insofar as it requires courts
to enforce arbitration agreements "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." '
What exactly a "knowing and voluntary" standard requires in the arbitration
context would have to emerge from decisions in individual cases. 18 The "knowing"
portion appears to require more emphatic, less ambiguous, manifestations of assent
than contract law requires. What makes an agreement "knowing" might be
mandatory disclosure of the sort involved in Doctor's Associates, more extensive
mandatory disclosure such as a thorough written and oral explanation of what
"arbitration" means,11 9 a separate signature line for the arbitration clause, a
"mandatory cooling-offperiod" in which the consumer could revoke the agreement,
or even a requirement that the consumer consult a lawyer before signing. The
"knowing and voluntary" standard also appears to have a far narrower definition of
"voluntary" than the one embodied in the contract law defense of duress. The
"voluntariness" test seems to resemble an overgrown unconscionability doctrine,
with much sensitivity to disparities in "bargaining power."'
120
The Ninth Circuit apparently adopted a "knowing and voluntary" standard for
arbitration in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai.12 1 It refused to enforce employees'
agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims because they did not "knowingly
contract."122 The Ninth Circuit's emphasis on "knowing" agreement appears to be
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1
(1997).
117. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1970 & Supp. 1997).
118. The "knowing and voluntary" standard is widely used in criminal law as the process for alienating rights,
while civil law generally uses contract as that process. Rubin, supra note 54, at 491 ("In criminal law, courts rely
on a conceptual framework derived from the Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), rule that a waiver is an
'intentional relinquishment of a known right.' In civil law, courts generally employ contract terminology in judging
the validity of waivers."). On the use of the terms "waiver" and "alienation," see supra note 54.
119. See Securities Indus. Assoc. v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114,1117 (Ist Cir. 1989) (citing MASS. REGS. CODE
tit. 950, § 12.204(G)(1)(a)-(c) (1988)).
120. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 108 ("voluntariness is often presumed on the theory that the adherent is
free to shop for better terms. But that is only true if shopping is feasible; if all the firms in the market impose the
same terms, shopping is impossible."); id. at 128 ("The compulsion to earn a living is almost universal, and to do
so it is typically necessary to work for someone else for pay."); Stempel, Bootstraping & Slouching, supra note 6,
at 1411 ("a free market ceases to exist, at least as to dispute resolution, unless the customer or the employee has
some meaningful alternatives."); Stempel, A BetterApproach, supra note 115, at 1434-35. Stempel's five proposed
grounds for avoiding arbitration agreements (Blameless Ignorance, Dirty-Dealing, Inescapable Adhesion,
Substantive Unconscionability, and Defective Agency) seem to put his approach in the "knowing and voluntary"
camp. Id.
121. 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 61 (1995). The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed Lai
in Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997). Judge Rymer's dissenting opinion in
Nelson explicitly argued for the contractual approach. Id. at 763-64.
122. Prudential Insurance Co., 42 F.3d at 1305.
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a subjective test of the sort criticized previously in this article.'23 The Ninth
Circuit's reasoning in Lai, and any of the proposed "knowing and voluntary"
standards, are inconsistent with Doctor's Associates and other Supreme Court cases
adopting the contractual approach. 24 They are, in short, bad law. But they might
become good law, either through amendment of the FAA or reconsideration by the
Court, perhaps in light of the constitutional argument raised above. So it is worth
briefly considering the relative merits of the "knowing and voluntary" approach and
the contractual approach.
b. The Merits
The preceding discussion outlines the virtue of the contractual approach: it
permits the alienation of rights with, and only with, the voluntary consent of the
rights-holder, thus providing freedom of choice to consumers (and others) and
empowering them to get consideration for the right to government adjudication. The
"knowing and voluntary" approach may appear to have these same virtues,125 but
there are two caveats.
First, some forms of the "knowing and voluntary" approach mandate disclosure,
restricting freedom by prohibiting the consumer from alienating her right to certain
information.126 Second, the "knowing and voluntary" approach may bar certain
people from alienating the right to government adjudication. The "knowing and
voluntary" approach seems to place great emphasis on the status of the party in
question. If a party is deemed an unsophisticated, "weak" consumer with low
"bargaining power" then that person may be incapable of alienating her right to
government adjudication. She may contract, and those contracts may have
arbitration clauses, but it may not be possible to make those clauses enforceable
under a "knowing and voluntary" standard. If the "knowing and voluntary" standard
were to have this effect then it would be operating like an inalienability rule for
123. See discussion supra Part I.B. It is not clear what result would have been reached under the contractual
approach. Courts split on whether the language involved in Lai covers employment disputes. Compare Farrand v.
Lutheran Bhd., 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993), with Kidd v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 32 .3d 516 (1 th Cir.
1994). And it is possible that a contract law defense to enforcement was present in Lai. But the Ninth Circuit did
not use this analysis. It rested its decision on its belief that the employees "could not have understood ... they were
agreeing to arbitrate sexual discrimination" claims because their contract "did not... describe the types of disputes
that were to be subject to arbitration." Prudential Insurance Co., 42 F3d at 1305.
124. The Ninth Circuit purports to derive this "knowingly" requirement from the legislative history of Title
VII. 42 E3d at 1304-05. It is unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court will read Title VII as requiring an
exception to the rule that"when deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter... courts generally
... should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts." First Options v. Kaplan, 115
S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1995). See also Jordan L. Resnick, Note, Beyond Mastrobuono: A Practitioners' Guide to
Arbitration, Employment Disputes, Punitive Damages, and the Implications of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 23
HOFSTRA L. REv. 913,923 (1995) (asserting that Lai "is clearly not in line with Gilmer and its progeny").
125. See Rubin, supra note 54, at 534 ("Both the voluntary and knowing framework and the contractual
framework are based on the concept of consent.").
126. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (discussing this standard).
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some parties. 27 It would discriminate among people, recognizing in some, but not
others, the capacity to contract.
Leaving aside the foregoing two caveats, the major difference between the
"knowing and voluntary" and contractual approaches can be characterized as a
difference about what constitutes "voluntary consent." The "knowing and
voluntary" approach has a more stringent view of "voluntary consent." Thus, it is
harder to alienate one's right to government adjudication under the "knowing and
voluntary" approach than it is under the contractual approach. 28 These additional
obstacles to alienating that right will be characterized as "safeguards" by advocates
of the "knowing and voluntary" approach. They guard the rights-holder from her-
self; from manifesting assent to something about which she has had insufficient
information or time to reflect.
This could be an argument for replacing all of contract law with the more
exacting "knowing and voluntary" standard.129 Doing so would present additional
obstacles (or safeguards) to the alienation of all rights. The more common argument
though, seems to be that the right to government adjudication should be subject to
the "knowing and voluntary" standard while other rights remain subject to contract
law."13 So alienation of the right to government adjudication requires overcoming
obstacles (or safeguards) not applicable to other rights. This position seems to rest
on the premise that the right to government adjudication is more important than
other rights,' or that people are more likely to undervalue this right than they are
to undervalue other rights.1
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Is the right to government adjudication more important than other rights?
Perhaps not, if the right to government adjudication is merely procedural. If an
arbitration agreement merely substitutes private procedures for government pro-
cedures, while leaving substantive rights unaffected, then it may not be particularly
important whether or not one has alienated the right to government adjudication.
An arbitration agreement, however, may alienate substantive, as well as pro-
cedural, rights. In fact, it may alienate all substantive rights because, if the arbi-
trator's decision does not correctly apply the law creating the rights, that decision
127. The same point may be made about the unconscionability doctrine. It is categorized as part of contract
law but can, when applied aggressively, become an (anti-contract) inalienability rule.
128. To put this another way, the transaction costs of alienating the right to government adjudication are
greater under the "knowing and voluntary" approach. These increased costs would presumably result in fewer
arbitration agreements than under the contractual approach.
129. See Stempel, Bootstrapping & Slouching, supra note 6, at 1393 n.30 ("The Lai approach should be the
norm for policing all contracts, not only arbitration agreements.").
130. See id. ("[C]ourts should impose a more searching standard of inquiry where the right allegedly waived
potentially implicates the party's ability to enforce a host of other rights.").
131. Id. at 1395 ("[Ihe arbitration contract... touches more closely on fundamental values of civic rights
and access to the courts than does the average contract.").
132. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory
Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REv. 449,453 (1996); Schwartz, supra
note 7, at 57 ("In her ignorant position, the adherent is most likely to undervalue the right to ajudicial forum.").
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is likely to be enforced anyhow.13 3 In such a case, one might argue that the parties,
by alienating the right to government adjudication, thereby alienated all other rights
as well.M Under this view, the right to government adjudication is as important as
all other rights combined because it includes them.
The Supreme Court rejects this view. The Court flatly denies that arbitration
agreements alienate all substantive rights. The Court maintains that"by agreeing
to arbitrate ... , a party does not forgo [certain] substantive rights... ; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral rather than judicial forum.' ' 35 Whether the
Court is correct about this is a fundamental issue of arbitration law. 36 If the Court
is wrong, then the right to government adjudication is singularly important because
it encompasses all other rights. That would not, however, strengthen the case for the
"knowing and voluntary" approach. Rather, it would strengthen the case for a
revived doctrine of substantive arbitrability. That is, pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments would remain enforceable, under contract law standards, to the extent they
cover claims regarding alienable rights. But they would not be enforced, regardless
of how "knowing and voluntary" they are, to the extent they cover claims regarding
rights which cannot be alienated prior to a dispute. This approach would sharply
reverse two decades of case law in which the Court has made virtually all claims
arbitrable. Thus, the issue is tremendously important but not, as just noted,
supportive of the "knowing and voluntary" approach.
If the Court is correct that the right to government adjudication is merely
procedural then the other premise underlying the "knowing and voluntary"
approach is implicated. That premise is that people are likely to undervalue the pro-
cedural rights lost by substituting arbitration for litigation. People will alienate these
procedural rights too easily because people do not appreciate their value.
The problem with this argument is that people differ in the value they place on
various rights. As Thomas Hobbes noted centuries ago, "The value of all things
contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors; and therefore the just
133. Courts do not closely review arbitration awards to ensure that arbitrators have correctly applied the law.
MACNEIL,FEDEPALARBITRATION, supra note 14, at § 40.7; Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 344-48; Kenneth
R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review ofArbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49,
85-120 (1997). Foran intriguing suggestion that Supreme Court opinions require courts to review arbitration awards
to ensure that arbitrators have correctly applied at least some substantive law, see Edward Brunet, Toward
Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1473-75 (1996).
134. See Schwartz, supra note 7, at 110-25. As Carrington and Haagen put it, enforcing arbitration agree-
ments allows parties "to contract out of effective private enforcement of regulations adverse to their interests,"
Carrington & Haagen, supra note 3, at 338. In other words, arbitration clauses are, not only choice-of-forum
clauses, but choice-of-law clauses as well. On this point, Carrington and Haagen deserve great credit for putting
arbitration agreements in the context of other contracts respecting jurisdiction. Id. at 350-61.
135. The Court has made this statement only about statutory rights. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481
(Securities Act); ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc., 482 U.S. at 229-30 (Securities Exchange Act & Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628 (Sherman Act).
136. See Stephen J. Ware, Privatizing Substantive Law Through Arbitration (forthcoming).
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value is that which they be contented to give." 137 In other words, there is no ob-
jective measure of the value of the right to government adjudication or any other
right; value is in the eye of the beholder.
There are undoubtedly those who place a high value on the procedural rights
lost by substituting arbitration for litigation. This group, I suspect, contains a
disproportionately large number of lawyers. Lawyers, I suggest, tend to emphasize
the virtues, and downplay the vices, of the procedures present in litigation but not,
typically, in arbitration. After all, many lawyers think they have a financial interest
in discouraging arbitration, and some actually do have such an interest. Further-
more, even lawyers whose motives are non-pecuniary may be inclined, simply
because they are accustomed to litigation, to value its procedures. Others in society
undoubtedly place less value on government adjudication. Lawyers ought to react
to that by improving litigation procedure so people will value it more highly, not
by changing the law to make it harder for people to opt out of it.
III. CONCLUSION
Arbitration law, including the arbitration law governing consumers, largely
rests on the contractual approach of alienability and voluntary disclosure. In con-
trast, much of the rest of consumer law reflects an anti-contract approach of
inalienability and mandatory disclosure. This contrast, I contend, is the starting
point for understanding debate about contemporary arbitration law. Critics of the
prevailing contractual approach to arbitration law seek to bring inalienability and/or
mandatory disclosure into the arbitration law governing consumers. These critics,
to the extent their criticism focuses on consumer arbitration, seek to make arbi-
tration law more like a lot of the other law governing consumers. That is, they seek
to make it anti-contract law. Those of us defending the contractual approach to
arbitration law must distinguish arbitration law from other areas of consumer law
or, as this Article has done, make the case for contract as the central principle of
consumer law.
137. THOMAS HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 93 (1651) (Nelle Fuller ed., 1952).

